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Abstract
Freund uses detailed trade, tariff,  and income data for  agreements  because the value of a developing  country
countries involved  in 91 trade agreements  negotiated  tariff preference  in terms  of its effect on trade
since 1980 to test for reciprocity  in free trade  preferences from a rich country  is quite small. The gains
agreements.  The results offer strong evidence  of  from unilateral liberalization  are likely to far outweigh
reciprocity in North-North and South-South free trade  potential gains from using protection as a bargaining
agreements, but there is little  empirical support for  chip in trade negotiations.
reciprocity in North-South trade agreements.  In  The evidence  is consistent with a repeated game  model
particular,  after  controlling for other determinants of  of trade liberalization.  The model presented shows that
trade preferences,  the results suggest that a one percent  trade preferences  granted are  increasing in trade
increase  in preferences  offered leads to about a one-half  preferences received.  This implies that countries can
of a percent increase in preferences received in North-  extract greater concessions from trade agreement
North and South-South trade agreements.  Freund also  members if they have higher external  trade barriers.
finds evidence that large countries extract greater trade  However,  if a country's trade barriers are very  large then
concessions  from small countries. This leads to a  the gains from reneging on the agreement in the short
modified  form of reciprocity  in North-South  agreements.  run will be high,  making the agreement unenforceable
A large increase in access to a developing country  market  despite offering long-term gains.  So, there is a
leads to only a small increase in access to a rich country  reciprocity-credibility  tradeoff.  High tariffs may allow
market.  countries to extract more concessions  from potential
The results imply that there are incentives for  trade agreement partners, but they also make the country
countries to maintain protection in order to extract more  less credible in actually implementing agreed tariff
concessions from trade partners.  But in general,  such  concessions. If a country's external tariff is very high
perverse  incentives should be less of a concern in  relative to other countries,  then it will not be able to
developing countries involved  in North-South  commit credibly  to any free trade agreement.
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I.  Introduction
The two pillars of the  GATT are nondiscrimination and reciprocity.  Article XXIV of the
GATT, which allows for the formation of trade blocs, has been derided as antithetical to
the GATT because it permits members of a trade bloc to discriminate  against
nonmembers.  What is less clear, however, is whether article XXIV is in sync with the
other pillar of GATT--reciprocity.  The language on reciprocity in the body of the GATT
is clear:  governments seek a "balance of concessions" and when presented with the
withdrawal of a trade concession, its trade partner is permitted to withdraw a
"substantially equivalent concession".  Article XXIV also includes language that could be
interpreted  as pertaining to reciprocity,  in that it calls for trade barriers "to be eliminated
with respect to substantially all trade between the constituent territories."  Thus, by
definition, preferential  trade agreements involve some degree of reciprocity because both
sides are expected to make full trade concessions.  But, unlike traditional multilateral
negotiations, this does not necessarily yield equivalent concessions since an agreement
can involve members of various sizes with vastly different trade barriers,  yielding gains
in market access that are far from symmetric.  In addition, some sensitive sectors are
typically excluded,  and many other types of trade barriers, such as antidumping claims or
technical  standards can remain in place, or even increase to offset tariff concessions.
The purpose of this paper is to examine theoretically and empirically what role
reciprocity has played in regional integration agreements.  The application of reciprocity
in multilateral tariff negotiations  has strong theoretical foundations.  In a series a papers,
Bagwell and Staiger show that terms-of-trade motives provide countries with incentives
2to have positive tariffs, creating a prisoner's dilemma, whereby  all countries would be
better off if they could cooperate and reciprocally  lower tariffs.1 They argue that the
articles of the GATT offer negotiating rules that help governments undo inefficient trade
restrictions generated by the terms-of-trade externality.  In other words, reciprocal tariff
reduction allows countries to credibly commit to lower tariffs  and reach a higher welfare
level.  Finger, Reincke,  and Castro (1999) find some evidence of reciprocity in terms of
tariff cuts offered in the Uruguay Round negotiations.2
The value of reciprocity in regional agreements  is less clear.  Unlike in
multilateral negotiations, where reciprocity enhances overall trade liberalization,
reciprocity in regional agreements (by definition) furthers discriminatory tariff reduction.
Reciprocity may be especially damaging in North-South agreements,  where asymmetries
in size suggest that low-income countries will have to make relatively larger trade
concessions to achieve an agreement with a high-income  country.  A need for reciprocity
also implies that some agreements should be infeasible;  for example, a large country
would gain too little from a free trade agreement with a very small low-tariff country to
make the agreement worthwhile.  Finally, reciprocity could provide incentives for low-
income countries to maintain higher trade barriers in order to obtain preferences  from
high-income countries, and as a result generate  greater trade diversion.
In this paper, we first examine the theoretical  foundations for reciprocity in free
trade agreements.  We follow Bagwell and Staiger and use a repeated game model to
analyze the question of what types of regional agreements  are sustainable.  In order to
achieve  a trade agreement, countries must have an incentive to sign the agreement and
I See Bagwell and Staiger (2000) for a summary of the literature.
2 About 30 percent of concessions given are matched by concessions received.
3the agreement must be self-enforcing.  Using an oligopolistic model of trade, we show
that it is easier to form an agreement with a large country, a high-cost country, or with
one that has high tariffs.  However, we also find that a country's credibility in enforcing
the agreement is decreasing in its tariff level.  Thus, there is a reciprocity-credibility
trade-off;  larger tariff reductions at home yield larger trade concessions abroad, but larger
tariff cuts are less likely to be self-enforcing.  The model also predicts that reciprocity
should be more important in agreements between countries with similar cost structures.
The intuition is that when costs differ, in addition to enhancing competition,  a
preferential agreement shifts production to the low-cost country, enhancing overall
welfare gains and making the agreement easier to sustain.
To examine reciprocity empirically, we use three measures of trade preferences.
The first uses detailecl tariff and trade data to calculate the bilateral trade-weighted tariff
for each country pair in a trade agreement.  The second uses the same data to calculate
the tariff revenue that will be lost as a result of a trade agreement; it is effectively a
measure of the gain in producer surplus in the exporting country.  The third focuses on
changes in market access subsequent to the formation of a trade agreement, where market
access is measured as changes in trade intensity indices (essentially trade shares adjusted
for income growth) following a regional agreement.  Using all three measures, we find
that the trade preferences  granted in a regional agreement are highly correlated across
country pairs.  Controlling for relative country size and separately also for country fixed
effects, we find that preferential access is the single most important variable determining
preferences granted.  Blecause of issues of simultaneity, we also instrument for
preferences with country-fixed effects.  The results are robust to this innovation.
4We also examine whether reciprocity in North-South agreements  is different from
reciprocity in other agreements.  The model implies that countries with similar costs
structures are more likely to require reciprocity to be self-enforcing.  The variation in
costs is likely to be greater when agreements are formed between North and South
countries, suggesting that reciprocity would be less important in North-South agreements.
In addition, work by John Whalley and various coauthors shows that concessions in
North-South trade agreements,  such as NAFTA, tend to be in areas other than tariffs.3 In
particular, the South gains insurance for its access to the North's market, while the North
gains concessions on environment and other non-tariff areas.  Similarly, Staiger (1998)
notes that GATT language does not require reciprocity by small countries, suggesting
that reciprocity in preferential  agreements between North and South countries is unlikely
to be driven by the same underlying forces as reciprocity in the GATT.4
Our results show little evidence of reciprocity in North-South agreements.  In
particular,  among North-South partners, preferences  in one country are not correlated
with preferences in the other country.  There is, however, a modified form of reciprocity;
North countries extract significantly more market access in South countries than South
countries extract from the North. Specifically,  a ten percent reduction in the developing-
country tariff yields only about a 2 percent reduction in the rich-country tariff;  in
3 Perroni and Whalley (2000) and Abrego et al. (1997).
4 Staiger's  comment was made in reference to a paper by Davis and Kowalczyk (1998).  They examine
tariff phase-outs in Mexico  and United States following NAFTA and look for evidence of reciprocity.
Their main finding is that the length of tariff phase-outs by sector in both Mexico and United  States is
increasing in the U.S. tariff.  The paper, however,  analyzes  a very narrow form of reciprocity because we
typically think of reciprocity as being intersectoral.  That is, we would expect the main trade concessions
that Mexico gives the United States to be in different sectors from the concessions that the United States
gives Mexico.
5contrast,  a 10 percent reduction in the large country tariff leads to an 33 percent reduction
in the poor country tariff.
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides the theoretical
framework.  Section 3 examines the empirical  importance of reciprocity in trade
agreements.  Section 4 concludes.
II. The Theoretical Framework
We use a three-country oligopolistic model of trade to evaluate the importance of
reciprocity in free trade agreements.  This model is appropriate for analyzing trade bloc
questions because optimal tariffs are non-zero and because regional agreements expand
the members' share of the world market and hence enhance profits abroad.  Gaining
preferential market access is an important and often clearly stated purpose of trade
agreements.5 The model is meant to be illustrative and highlight the importance of
country size, market structure, and reciprocity in achieving a free trade agreement.
There is one good, which is produced by a single profit-maximizing  firm in each
country and segmented  markets lead to trade in this good (as in Brander and Krugman
(1983)).  Since large markets are likely to have more firms, the one-firm assumption
would be strong if  we did not allow variation in production costs.  Lower domestic
production costs and more intense domestic competition will both have similar effects  on
trade.  They will reduce the extent to which consumers benefit from international trade
and will also depress the profits of foreign firms.
5For example,  the U.S. Trade Representative  argues that because Canada and Mexico have trade
agreements with other countries  in the region "U.S. businesses  are losing marketshare.  U.S.  wheat and
potato farmers,  for example, are now losing markets in Chile to Canadian exports" (Robert Zoellick,  May
7, 2001)
6We assume that the inverse demand function, pi(Q),  in each country (X, Y, and Z)
is linear.  Specifically, Pi (Q')  = 1- a'Q t, and Q'  = qi  + qi + qz, where Q' is the total
quantity consumed in country i, q'  is the quantity produced by the firm inj for market i,
and a' varies with the size of the market, smaller countries have larger a's.
Competition is Cournot. Profits to the firm from countryX, in country i, ir, are
(1)  or'  = qP'  (Q')-cXxq  -t  ,tq,
where,  ci is the constant marginal cost of production in country i, and  t'  is the tariff that
the firm from countryj faces in market i.  Solving for the profit maximizing quantity of a
firm from country X in market i, we have
(2)  qi = (1-3(cy +tX)+cy +cz +t  +tz)
(2)  q,,  ~~~4a'
Equation (2) shows that higher domestic costs reduce quantity, while higher foreign costs
increase quantity.  A sufficient condition for each firm to sell in each market is that
t,  < (1- 3cx + c,  + c,)/  3,  which we assumes holds.
The government's welfare function,  W,  in country X, is the sum of consumer
surplus, producer surplus, and tariff revenue.
(3)  W =  U(Qx)  PxQx +  E  (qIP' -cxq'  -t'q')+txq +tq
x,y,z
If there are no free trade agreements then the government maximizes welfare,
equation (3) over t'  and  tz,  taking other countries' tariffs as given. Under MFN, the
tariff on Y  must be equivalent to the tariff on Z, resulting in an optimal tariff of
3 -cs -cy  - cz
t =  x  O  . Note that in this model the optimal tariff in one country is not a
10
7function of the tariffs implemented abroad or of the size of the market (a'). But it is a
function of marginal production costs-higher costs are associated with lower tariffs in
all countries.  Regardless of what policy other countries follow, a single country is always
better off with a positive tariff.  However, if each country installs its optimal tariff then
all countries are worse off than they would be at free trade. Each country is made better
off if some reciprocal  bilateral or multilateral tariff reduction is achievable.
III.  A Free Trade Agreement
Two conditions must be met in order for countries to participate in a free trade
agreement.  First, an incentive constraint must be satisfied, the agreement must make
countries better off.  Second, the agreement must be self-enforcing,  long-run gains must
make it worthwhile for countries to commit to the agreement,  as opposed to maintaining
tariffs.
Incentive constraint
A free trade agreement will only be approved if the welfare of the member
countries is improved.  That is, it must be the case that welfare after the bilateral tariff
reduction exceeds welf are with ex ante tariffs.  Using the welfare function  above,
substituting quantities  in from Equation (2) and solving yields the incentive constraint for
an agreement between countryXand country Y. Specifically the constraint is:
(-6+18cy +2c  - 14c2)tx _tx 2 6(1-3cx +,cy +c)ty  -3ty 2
32aX  16ay
The first term in equation (4) represents  the net domestic loss that results from the decline
in a country's own tariff, the increase in consumer surplus and the loss in domestic profits
8and tariff revenue.  The second term is the gain in profits abroad that results from the
decline in the foreign tariff.  An agreement is more likely to be welfare improving when
ax is large and a'  is small-i.e. the small country gains more from the agreement.  In
addition, it is more welfare enhancing when the cost in the other member country, cy, is
relatively large-that is, the low-cost country gains more from the agreement.  A low
domestic tariff, t,  and a high partner-country tariff,  tP,  also increase the value of the
agreement.  The incentive constraint will always be satisfied for both countries, when
countries are similar in size, cost structure, trade policy, and the extent of the tariff
reduction-as is more likely to be the case in a North-North or a South-South  agreement.
Alternatively, the incentive constraint may be satisfied for both parties if the smaller
country or the low-cost country offers greater trade concessions.
Sustainability
We use a repeated game framework to evaluate the extent to which a trade
agreement between two countries is self-enforcing.6 In order for a bilateral agreement to
be sustainable, the welfare gain from cheating on the agreement and then returning to the
MFN tariff equilibrium forever must not exceed the welfare level from committing to the
agreement.  We consider cheating and punishment to consist of failing to install the
preferences  (i.e. maintaining status quo tariff) and returning to the ex ante tariff level
forever.  Alternatively, we could use the Nash tariff level as punishment, which would
further the extent to which tariff reduction is achievable  since the punishment phase
would be more severe.  However,  since countries are constrained by the WTO, using the
more conservative status quo punishment is more realistic.  Specifically,
6  See Freund (2000) for more details on the repeated game analysis in this type of model.
9(4)  Wdevite  +  W  <I
(+1  - *punishment  - 1  a  Wbilateral
Where 3 is the discount rate.  We can solve this equation for maximum size of the tariff
cut that is achievable  between any two partners.
Using the welfare function  above and substituting quantities  in from Equation (2)
and solving yields the  cutoff discount rate (8 ) such that a free trade agreement is
feasible.
(  6-18cy -- 2c, +14C, +tx  ayt_  a
6-18c5 4 6cy +6cz -3ty  2axtY
Equation (5) implies that the cutoff discount rate that X needs to achieve an agreement
with Y is lower, i.e. commitment is easier, if Y's market is relatively large (ar/ax is small),
y is a relatively high cost country (cy is high relative to cr), and the preferential treatment
Y offers is relatively large (t/It  is small).  The intuition is that if  the foreign market is
large, the foreign producer has high costs, and/or the foreign preferential  treatment
granted is extensive then preferential market access is worth more and countries have less
incentive to cheat on the agreement.
This implies thiat there is a credibility-reciprocity tradeoff with respect to trade
policy and participation in free trade agreements.  Countries have an easier time
committing to free trade agreements when the preferential  access offered is relatively
small, but countries can extract greater market access abroad by offering more
preferential  treatment in return.  This provides  an intuition for why some agreements may
never be implemented.  Countries offer more to get more, but their concessions  are
simply not credible in equilibrium.
10To examine  the set of possible agreements we rewrite equation (5)  in terms of the
cutoff tariff level needed to make an agreement feasible.
(6)  tX< 6-18c,  +6cy +6c, -3ty  2axtY
6 -18cy  -2c,  +1l4cz  + t'  aY
If tariffs are low, the first term will be determined largely by cost structure and we can
rewrite equation (6) as
2axtY
Equation (7) says that the maximum tariff level such that an agreement is feasible is
nearly proportional to the tariff level abroad, the market structure, the relative size of the
two countries, and the discount rate.  Taking logs of both sides yields
ax (8)  In t'  < In(M) +  n(f(cx, cy )) +  n(-  +In  t y=t  x
By symmetry, a similar equation will also maintain for country Y.
(9)  In tY  <-  ln(245) + ln(f  (cy,o)  +, n7)- )+  Intx  = ty
a
Equation (9) implies that there is a range of preferences  for each country such that
agreements are feasible.  Figure 1 presents this range graphically.  Country X's constraint
shows the minimum tariff preference that country Y must grant country X for a given
level of preference in X's market.  Any point above this constraint is feasible from
country X's perspective since it gets more from country Y than is required for the
agreement to be self-enforcing.  Similarly, country Y's constraint shows the minimum
preference that Y requires from X, for any given level of preference Y offers.  From Y's
perspective, any point to the right of country  Y's locus is feasible.  The area between the
11two lines displays the range of feasible agreements,  and points A, B and C all represent
feasible agreements.  In contrast, the agreement represented by point D is not feasible
from Y's perspective since the preferential treatment that X offers Y is not enough to
justify granting such large preferences to X in return.
The model shows that preferences granted will be increasing in the level of
preferences received.  However, small changes in preferences  granted may have no effect
on the level of preferences received, provided both constraints are satisfied.  For example,
points A and B in Figure 1 represent two feasible agreements,  but point B is better for
country X than point A because it gets more in return.  This implies that point B might be
the more likely agreemnent if X has more bargaining power, and point A the outcome if Y
has more bargaining rower.
The closer the enforceability constraints are to each other, the smaller is the range
of feasible agreements  and the more important is reciprocity in determining outcomes.  If
the constraints are very far apart then reciprocity may not be as important in determining
preferences;  outcomes will depend much more on other things, such as country
characteristics,  relative bargaining power, and political issues.
Equations (8) and (9) imply that there is a range of tariff pairs where agreements
are feasible, and the range is increasing in the discount rate.  If 8 is very small, then it is
possible that there are no agreements that are self-enforcing,  as shown in Figure 2.  The
intuition is that countries care very little about the future so they will cheat on any
agreement.
The distance between the constraints also depends on relative costs.  The more
similar are the costs the more likely it is that the constraints are close to each other.  To
12see this, note that country X faces a constraint with f(cx,cy)  and by symmetry, country Y
faces a constraint f(cy,c,).  For feasible values of c,,,  cy and c_,  x  is negative,  a  is
acx  acy
positive, and  <  . This implies that when costs structures are different, the
ac,  &cy
constraints are more likely to be far apart, all else equal.  The intuition is that when costs
are different,  a regional agreement not only increases production but also shifts more to
the low-cost producer, which magnifies the output effect.  This cost-shifting effect makes
the agreement more welfare improving and hence easier to enforce.
By contrast, market size does not effect the extent to which the constraints bind
t  = _  ;  x .Relative  to countries of an equal size, the small-country constraint shifts
out, indicating that it can support more concessions for a given level of preferences
received.  The large country constraint shifts in by an identical amount, indicating that it
can grant less preferences  for a given level of preferences received.  Thus, both
constraints shift, but the distance between them is unaffected.
IV. Empirical Analysis
In this section, we test the extent to which reciprocity is important in determining
preferences  offered in free trade agreements.  The model shows that reciprocity plays a
critical role in determining the set of feasible regional agreements.  This role is
heightened if the feasibility constraints are close together,  as in Figure 3, where more
preferential treatment by one party must be reciprocated in order for an agreement to be
13sustainable.  In this case, reciprocity determines  actual outcomes.  In contrast, Figure 4
shows a case where reciprocity is important in determining the set of feasible agreements,
but where reciprocity has little influence on precise outcomes.  The circles represent the
space of possible agreements,  and the filled circles are actual agreements.  In this case,
reciprocity determines which agreements  are feasible, but observed outcomes are more
closely related to other variables.  If the incentive constraints tend to be close together
then we should find that reciprocity is important in regional agreements.
To look for evidence of reciprocity we use three measures of actual trade
preferences  that counties grant one another.  First, using detailed trade and tariff data, we
calculate ex ante trade-weighted  average bilateral tariffs.  Second, we use tariff data and
exports before the agreement to estimate lost tariff revenue. The second measure also
captures the transfer of tariff revenue from the importing country to producer surplus in
the exporting country. Third, we create an index of the change in market share from the
agreement. This measures the extent to which the regional agreement led to increased
bilateral trade in each country.  More specific descriptions of each measure follow.
The most basic measure of preferences  is the trade-weighted  tariff.
(7)  tariWfj = Y  J.
k  exp)orts,
where  MFN; is the tariff in countyj on industry k, exports  are exports from i toj in
industry k, and  exports,  are total exports.  Bilateral tariffs are available from the
TRAINS  database and total bilateral exports are from the IMF International Financial
Statistics.
14Using this measure, the triangles in Figure 5 represent the preferences offered by
one party of a trade agreement versus the preferences received.  The scatter plot offers
some evidence that reciprocity is important-the bilateral concessions of one trade
partner seem to be increasing in the concessions granted by the other partner-even
without controlling for country size and income levels.  As a control, the diamonds show
preferences  of each country in an agreement relative to the world, where preferences  are
measured as the trade-weighted tariff via the world. Therefore,  the diamonds represent
preference pairs if regional agreement members granted each other the preference that an
exporter with the world export structure would receive.  The diamonds appear to be
uniformly distributed within a range, suggesting that if bilateral agreements involved
tariffs reductions to an average world partner then reciprocity would not be important.
The graph suggests that countries in regional agreements tend to offer bilateral
preferences  that are more similar to each other than they are to the rest of the world.
One problem with the simple trade-weighted tariff is that it does not capture the
relative importance of an export market.  For example, the U.S. and Canadian trade-
weighted tariffs on Mexican imports could be very similar, but since the United States is
a much larger market for Mexican goods, U.S. preferences are worth more to Mexico.
This relates to the notion in the GATT that reciprocity involves trade policy affecting an
equivalent amount of trade.  Including GDP in the equation will control for this to the
extent that it is only market size that matters.  But, it could also be tastes, proximity,  and
endowments.
The second measure controls for this market relevance  effect.  It is a measure of
gain in producer surplus in the exporting country,  or the forgone tariff revenue in the
15importing country.  It is the bilateral tariff in a six-digit sector multiplied by the trade in
that sector, summed across all sectors. It is calculated as follows:
(8)  producer  surplus,  = tariffy * exportsV,
It is thus the amount of tariff revenue that the importing country will forgo collecting as a
result of the trade agreement, assuming that all tariffs are removed.7 To the extent that
prices remain roughly unchanged,  it also represents  a gain in producer surplus to the
exporting country.  Hence, the measure will be increasing in exports and also in tariffs,
provided the elasticity of trade to tariffs does not exceed one in absolute  value.
While these measures provide a good proxy for the extent to which firms gain
from liberalization in the other country, and hence how balanced the agreement is, there
are some problems with both measures.  First, as previously noted, not all tariffs are
necessarily removed when the agreement is signed,  so they might overstate the gains in
some cases and perhaps fail to show reciprocity,  even though reciprocity is actually
present.  Second, tariffs are not the only trade barriers.  Third, the data required to
calculate this measure are only available for 52 agreements concluded after  1989.  Still, if
agreements at least approach genuine free trade agreements and tariffs are the primary
barriers that are negotiated, then only agreements that offer similar return should be
signed.  In this case., this measure should roughly capture the extent of reciprocity.
The third measure focuses on increases in trade to capture the extent to which
concessions are actually made.  It attempts to estimate the magnitude of all barriers, not
7More specifically,  it is calculated as the average trade-weighted tariff in the year before the agreement,  or
if that is not available the closest year to that year.  We also attempt to match as closely as possible the year
of the tariff data in the partner countries.  The trade weighted  tariff is then multiplied by average trade in
the four-year period before the agreement was concluded in order to control for possible anomalies in trade
flows in a particular year.
16just tariffs, that are lowered.  It uses data on bilateral trade among members of 91
regional agreements negotiated between  1980 and 1999 to estimate changes in market
share, where market share is estimated using the so-called "export intensity index", Ijj.
(6)  Ivj  =  X 9
XROW,j
The numerator in Equation (6) isj's share of i's exports, and the denominator isj's share
of the rest-of-the-world's  exports.8 The export intensity index describes how much i
exports toj relative to how much the rest of the world exports toj. An export intensity
index of unity implies thatj's share of i's exports is identical toj's share of rest-of-the-
world exports. The important feature of this index is that, with constant income elasticity
of trade across countries, it will not increase as a result of regional income growth in the
importing country.  This is becausej's share of i's exports (the numerator of the index)
increases in exactly the same proportion asj's of world exports (the denominator of the
index).  This measure of market access is defined as the average intensity in the four-year
period following the agreement less the average intensity in the four-year period
preceding the agreement and denoted it as AIij.  Trade intensity indices are constructed
from the fo.b. bilateral trade data recorded  in the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.
For the purposes of computing all three indices, for the members of a new union
(eg MERCOSUR), we examine all bilateral pairs; for countries acceding to a well-
established union (eg. Austria to the EU), we consider only exports from the new member
to the union and vice versa, not each pair of countries.  The intuition is that negotiations
for a new union take place at a country-to-country level, but negotiations between a
8 See Anderson and Norheim (1993) for a detailed description of trade intensity indices.
17country and a union take place at a country-to-union  level.  Table 1 in the appendix lists
all of the agreements used for each measure.
In the first stage, we look at partial correlations between  tgy and tji, PSi  and PSji
and AIij and AIji.  In addition to measures of preferences,  theory suggests that preferences
granted should be a function of country size and market structure.  Bigger countries
should get a relatively greater increase in market access abroad since the value of their
tariff reduction to other countries is worth relatively more.  However, if  there are
increasing returns to scale, or bigger countries simply have lower cost (or more) finns,
then the market-size effect will be dampened. The basic regression equation that we
estimate, for each measure, is:
(7)  preferencey, = a  + / 1 preferencej, + fl 2gdpi + /33gdp 1 +  ,
where preference is one of the three measures (ln(tariff),  ln(producer surplus), or the
change in the intensity index), and small letters denote the natural log of the variables.
Theory predicts that ,B should be positive; an increase in preferences  granted should lead
to an increase in preference received.  Indeed, with perfect reciprocity the coefficient
should be unity.  The null hypothesis is that J1 is zero-representing  the case where the
gains to one country are uncorrelated with the gains to the other country.  This would be
the self-enforcing constraints never bind, i.e. the gap between them is very wide, and
agreements are much more a function of other factors.  For example, countries may have
varying bilateral trade barriers, join trade agreements at random, and give full trade
concessions.  In this case, countries would get greater concessions  from an agreement
with a high-tariff country and less from an agreement with a low-tariff country.  Since
agreements are chosen randomly there is no reason to think that the preferences  measures
18should be correlated-country-fixed  effects (used below) should account for most of the
variation in the measure of preferences.
The signs of  32  and 013 depend on the relative  importance of market size effects.
If market size is very important then 02 should be positive and f3 should be negative-
and they should be of a similar magnitude.  If costs (and extent of domestic  competition)
play an important role then the signs of the coefficients is ambiguous.9
One econometric problem with this regression is that errors are likely to be
correlated across bilateral pairs.  Each agreement enters as two observations, for example,
CUSFTA enters once with the US preferences  in Canada as a dependent variable and
once with Canadian preferences  in the US as a dependent  variable.  We correct the errors
for pairwise correlation  as well as heteroskedasticity using Rogers (1993)  and White
(1980), respectively.
The results are reported in the columns  (1), (4), and (7) of Table 1. All of the
signs are as predicted, but only the coefficient on the preference variable is significant  in
all of the specifications at standard confidence levels.  In particular,  the coefficient of
about.6 on the tariff variable implies that a 10 percent bilateral tariff cut in one country
leads to about a 6 percent cut in the other country's tariff.  The coefficient of .5 on the
producer surplus variable implies that a ten percent increase in tariff revenue lost leads to
a 5 percent increase in producer surplus gained.  The coefficient of .3 on the share
variable implies that a 10 percent increase in i's access toj's market is associated with
about a 3 percent increase inj's access to i's market.  These estimates are somewhat
9 We also try including log population in the regression equation,  to see if level of development  is
important, but it was not significant and the coefficients on the preferences  were unchanged (not reported).
19higher than estimates by Finger, Reincke, and Castro (1999) for tariff concessions  in the
Uruguay Round;  they find that 29 percent of concessions were reciprocated.
The coefficient on GDPi and  GDPj  in the tariff and intensity indices regressions
are positive and negative, respectively,  as market size effects would predict-implying
that the market access; that a country receives for a given level of preferences  granted is
increasing in its relative size-but the coefficients  are not significant.' 0
Columns (2), (5)  and (7) of Table  1 augment the basic specification to include
importer and exporter country-fixed effects,  instead of GDP.  Country-fixed effects will
capture the extent to w(hich certain countries always give/receive  the same access, due to
market size and market structure effects.  While these turn out to be important
determinants of preferences, they do not appear to be correlated  with reciprocity since the
coefficients on preferenceji  remain almost unchanged in each of the three cases."l  On
average, the R-squares  in the regressions  suggests that about half of the explained
variation is due to reciprocity and about half is due to country fixed effects.  The
remaining variation among agreements could be a result of bargaining, mis-measurement,
or other agreement issues that are not in the model such as labor, the environment or
investment treaties.
This simple regression implies that the null hypothesis-there  is no correlation
between preferences  granted and preferences received-can be eliminated.  But, there are
'° We also test joint significance  and in most cases the coefficients are not jointly significant at standard
levels.
l One additional concern is that the results could be generated by the type of trade agreement;  for instance,
some agreements  are deeper than others, and as a result might produce greater changes in trade.  To some
extent this would be evidence of reciprocity, since countries choose how far to go, but it would be a
different kind of reciprocity--at the bloc level instead of the country level.  To test for this, we augment the
analysis to include bloc fixed effects.  Again, the results remain robust (not reported), suggesting  that
bilateral reciprocity plays an important role in trade agreements.
20still some econometric  issues that need to be addressed.  If the model is correct, the
estimated coefficient on preferences is biased because preferences  are jointly determined
and because of measurement error.  Specifically,  since preferences  in i are an increasing
function of preferences inj, and vice versa, the coefficient estimate is likely to be
overstated.  On the other hand, since we are using tariffs and outcomes to proxy for true
preferential policy, both the dependent and independent variables are likely to be
measured with error.  Assuming the measurement error in the dependent and independent
variables are normally distributed and uncorrelated with each other, the error in the
explanatory variable would tend to bias the coefficient on preferences towards zero.
To deal with these problems we use instrumental  variables technique.' 2 We
instrument for preferences with importer and exporter fixed effects.  Country fixed
effects make ideal instruments because they are exogenous  and are highly correlated with
preferences.  Moreover, they should also be uncorrelated with the measurement error in
preferences.  The results are reported in Columns (3), (6) and (9) of Table 1. In each
case, the coefficient on the preference variable is almost unchanged,  suggesting that the
two effects roughly offset each other in the OLS regressions.
North-South Agreements:  Are Some  Agreements Less Equal than Others?
The model shows that agreements where marginal costs are very different are less likely
to require reciprocity.  In this section, we consider this prediction by evaluating North-
South agreements,  where costs structures are likely to be very different, implying that
reciprocity is less likely to prevail in North-South agreements.
12 The parameter in question is not identified in a simultaneous equations approach.
21This prediction is also supported by other work on North-South agreements.
Staiger (1998) notes that the notion of reciprocity as intended in the GATT may not carry
over to North-South regional agreements,  since even in multilateral negotiations small
countries have not been required to offer reciprocal concessions  to large countries.  The
1979 Enabling Clause encourages  industrialized countries not to seek reciprocal
concessions that are "inconsistent with their individual development,  financial, and trade
needs".  In addition, industrialized  countries may have other motivations for signing free
trade agreements with developing countries.  The concessions by developing countries
may not directly relate to trade, but involve issues like investment, technical  standards,
intellectual property rights, and competition policy. 13  Additional evidence that such
agreements may be different comes from the number of programs designed to
unilaterally give preferences  to developing countries, such as Europe's Everything-But-
Arms initiative and the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act in the United States.  On the
other hand, there has also been a recent emergence of agreements that are less one-sided.
The Cotonou Agreement,  for example, rescinds the one-way preferences that Europe
gave countries in Africa and the Caribbean and replaces them with free trade agreements.
An alternative to Staiger's  argument may be that precisely because small countries have
not been required to make reciprocal concessions in multilateral negotiations, large
countries are using regional agreements to extract concessions.
In this section, we examine whether North-South agreements  are different.  South
countries are defined as those with per-capita income below $10,000 in  1995.  Table 2
reports the results from running the regressions  separately on North-South country pairs.
13 See Limao for a model of how such agreements  could be negotiated simultaneously  with a trade
agreement.
22For both the tariff and the producer surplus measures there is no evidence of reciprocity
in North-South agreements.  However, market share changes are correlated in the OLS
regressions, though this result is not robust for North-South country pairs in the
instrumental variables regression.  This could suggest that country-fixed  effects are not
good predictors of preferences  in North-South agreements.  However, results from a
regression of preferences on country fixed effects in North-South agreements have an R-
square of  0.41.  The implications of this are not clear.  One possibility is that since
preferences  are measured with error, there could be a spurious correlation in preferences.
To examine this question in more detail we split each sample according to the size
of the market, and use seemingly unrelated regressions techniques.  Specifically,  in one
sample the dependent variable is the increased market access the smaller country (the
South) gives to the larger country (North) and the other sample has the opposite.  This
specification allows big countries and small countries to have different coefficients  on the
preference variable.  For example, if the North has most of the bargaining power then for
a given change in access to its market, the North should be able to extract relatively more,
i.e. the coefficient on North access offered should be greater than the coefficient on South
access offered.  The results are reported in Table 3.  For both the tariff and the market
access measures they suggest that South countries have relatively less bargaining power
than North countries.  For example, for a  10 percent increase  in the South's access to the
North, the North extracts  15 percent increase in access to the South.  In contrast, for a 10
percent increase in access to the South, the South extracts  only about a 5 percent increase
in access to the North.  The asymmetry can not be a result of a higher average tariffs in
the South than in the North because the constant will pick up average tariffs.  It is worth
23noting that doing a similar exercise on other agreements produces somewhat different
results.  Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 report the results for these other agreements.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that reciprocity is important in free trade agreements.  In
particular,  the results suggest that a one percent increase in preferences  offered leads to
about a one-half of a percent increase in preferences received.  One exception is in North-
South agreements,  where we find a modified form of reciprocity that is related to country
size: a one percent increase in preferences  offered by the big (small) country leads to
more (less) than a one percent increase in preferences received.
From a policy ]perspective,  the results suggest that incentives to maintain
protection to extract more concessions  in a trade agreement are of concern.  In general,
however, they should be less of a concern in North-South agreements  since the marginal
value of a developing-country tariff reduction in terms of its effect on reciprocal
reduction is very small.  The gains from unilateral  liberalization are likely to far outweigh
potential gains from using protection as a bargaining chip.
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27.Figure 5:  Preferences in Actual Agreements
25  -
000  0  00  0 
20-  A
A
~~ 15  ~~  ~  A  o  world
S6.  15  - 14  O^  ^  L  A  A, bilateral <,  1-  8k  &  A  A  A.  *
4.01  S  ^ 0i  0  0
OO,MO*  ot  0  0  A, OA  0
5  - **i'  A*>  *  A
A  A
0  IL
0  10  20  30
tariff in X
28Table 1:  Determinants of Trade Preferences
tij  tij  tij  psij  psij  psij  Alij  Al\ij  Ali
_______  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  ()  ()  9
tji  0.58**  0.63**  0.57**
(4.40)  (3.47)  (6.02)
psji  0.51**  0.40**  0.56**
(11.68)  (3.91)  (9.12)
AIji  .31**  0.31*  0.29**
(3.82)  (2.33)  (2.54)
gdpi  0.06  0.06  0.43**  0.38  0.02  0.02
(1.06)  (1.06)  (2.97)  (2.49)  (0.80)  (0.79)
gdpj  -0.02  -0.02  0.47**  0.42  -0.02  -0.02
(-0.39)  (-0.37)  (6.65)  (5.45)  (0.92)  (-0.83)
Country  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No
fixed
effects
Method  OLS  OLS  IV  OLS  OLS  IV  OLS  OLS  IV
NOB  104  104  104  104  104  104  182  182  182
R-  0.35  0.87  0.35  0.68  0.88  0.68  0.10  .44  0.10
SquareI  II
Mlij is the percenage change in i's export intensity toj.  Errors corrected for
heteroskedasticity  and pairwise correlation. All regressions  include a constant tenn,
values for the constant not reported.  **Significant at the 1 percent level.*Significant  at
the 5 percent level. In columns (3) and (4) country fixed effects are used as instruments
for Alji.
29T'able 2: Reciprocity in North-South Agreements
tij  _  PSi,  AI,j
North-  Other  North-  Other  North-  Other  North-  Other
South  South  South  South
(  __ _(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
tji  -0.05  0.68**
(-0.45)  (6.53)
PSjM  -0.12  0.50**
(-0.36)  (11.98)
AIji  .39**  0.25*  -0.11  0.37**
(3.02)  (2.55)  (-0.54)  (3.87)
Ln(GDP1)  0.29  0.42  1.66**  0.43*  0.03  0.02  0.04  0.02
(1.42)  (0.67)  3.09  (2.04)  (0.72)  (0.44)  (0.63)  (0.58)
Ln(GDPj)  0.23  -0.00  1.63**  0.55**  0.00  -0.04  0.02  -0.04
(1.69)  (-0.03)  (3.38)  (5.68)  (0.11)  (-1.59)  (0.39)  (-1.67)
Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV
NOB  22  82  22  82  58  124  58  124
R-Square  0.21  0.45  0.88  0.62  0.16  .07  0.00  .06
A constant is included in all regressions, value not reported. Errors corrected for
heteroskedasticity  and pairwise correlation.  *Significant at the 5% level. **  Significant at
the 1% level.
30Table 3:  Determinants of Large and Small Country Preferences
Total  North-South  Other
Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small
Access  Access  Access  Access to  Access  Access
to Small  to Large  to Small  Large  to Small  to Large
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
tji  1.39**  0.58**  3.31**  0.17**  1.38**  0.63**
(9.71)  (9.71)  (3.12)  (3.12)  (9.98)  (9.98)
PSji  2.11**  .41**  1.00  0.10  2.25**  0.39**
(11.04)  (11.04)  (1.05)  (1.05)  (10.05)  (10.05)
AIj;  .64**  .52**  1.59**  .43**  0.42**  0.56**
(6.07)  (6.07)  (5.89)  (5.89)  (4.11)  (4.11)
All regressions  run with a constant and gdpi and gdpj using SUR.  Only the
coefficients  on preference variables  from each regression are reported.  Columns
(1), (3), and (5)  report the results when the small country's preferences granted is
the dependent variable.  Columns (2), (4), and (6) report the results when the large
countrys' preferences granted is the dependent variable.
31Appendix Table 1:  Regional Integration Agreements
Used  in  Tariff and
Agreement  Date of entry  Type of agreement  Producer Surplus
into force  Measure
CER/ Australia-New Zealand  1-Jan-83  Free trade  No
______ _____  agreement  N
United States - Israel  19-Aug-85  Free trade  No
______ _____  agreement  N
EC accession of Portugal and Spain  1-Jan-86  Accession to  No
customs union  N
Mercosur/ Argentina  Brazil Paraguay  29-Nov-91  Customs union  Yes
Uruguay  29-Nov-91  Customs_union_Ye
EC  - Czech Republic  1-Mar-92  Free trade  Yes
_____________________  ~agreem ent
EC - Slovak Republic  1-Mar-92  Free trade  Yes
_________  _________  _________agreem  entYe
EC - Hungary  1-Mar-92  Free trade  Yes agreementYe
EC - Poland  1-Mar-92  Free trade  Yes
____  ___  ____  ___  ____  ___  ___  ___  ____  ___  ag reem ent  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
EFTA - Turkey  1-Apr-92  Free trade  No
______  ______  ______  ______  . ___agreem  ent
EFTA - Czech Republic  1-Jul-92  Free trade  No
______________  ______________agreem  ent  N
EFTA - Slovak Republic  1-Jul-92  Free trade  No
_______  _______  _______  _______agreem  ent_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Czech Republic - Slovak Republic  1-Jan-93  Customs union  No
EFTA - Israel  1-Jan-93  Free trade  No
____  ___  ____  ___  ____  ___  ___  ___  ____  ___  agreem ent  N
CEFTA1 Bulgaria Czech Republic
Hungary Poland Romania Slovak  1-Mar-93  FreeYes/  except Bulgaria
Republic Slovenia  agreement  Yes
EC - Romania  1-May-93  Free trade  No
____  ___  ____  ___  ____  ___  ___  ___  ____  ___  agreem entY  e
EFTA - Romania  1-May-93  Free trade  N
_____  ____  ____  ____  _____  _  __  ____  ____  agreem ent  N
Chile - Venezuela  1-July-93  Free trade  Ye
____  ___  ____  ___  ____  ___  ___  ___  ____  ___  agreem entY  e
EFTA - Bulgaria  1-Jul-93  Free trade  No
________  _______  ___  ____  _______  agreem ent  N
EFTA - Hungary  1-Oct-93  Free trade  No
____  ___  ____  ___  ____  ___  ___  ___  ____  ___  agreem ent  N
EFTA - Poland  15-Nov-93  Free trade  No 32__  _ _ _ _ _  _agreement
32EC - Bulgaria  31-Dec-93  Free trade  No
_________  _________  _________agreem  ent  N
Chile -Colombia  1-Jan-94  Free Trade  Yes
____  ____  ____  ____  ___  ____  ___  ____  ___  A  greem ent
NAFTA  1-Jan-94  Free trade  Yes
.__  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _agreem ent
BAFTAI  Estonia Latvia Lithuania  1-Apr-94  Free trade  No
______  _____  agreem ent  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Bolivia- Mexico  1-Jan-95  agreement  Yes
Colombia-Mexico-Venezuela  1  -Jan-95  Free trade  Yes
.____  ____  ____  ____  ____  ____agreem  ent
Costa Rica -Mexico  1-Jan-95  Free trade  Yes
EC - Lithuania  1-Jan-95  Free trade  Yes
agreementYe
EC - Estonia  1-Jan-95  Free trade  Yes
agreement
EC - Latvia  1-Jan-95  Free trade  Yes
agreementYe
EC accession of Austria, Finland and  1-Jan-95  Accession to  Yes
Sweden  customs union
EFTA - Slovenia  1-Jul-95  Free trade  No
agreement
CEFTA accession of Slovenia  1-Jan-96  Accession to free  No
trade  agreement
EC - Turkey  1-Jan-96  Customs  union  Yes
EFTA - Estonia  1-Jun-96  Free trade  No
______________  _____________agreem  ent  N
EFTA - Latvia  1-Jun-96  Free trade  No
______________  _____________agreem  ent  N
Slovenia - Latvia  1-Aug-96  Free trade  No
EFTA - Lithuania  1-Aug-96  Free trade  No
______________  _____________agreem  ent  N
Chile - Mercosur  1-Oct-96  Free trade  Yes
______________  _____________agreem  entYe
Slovak Republic - Israel  1-Jan-97  Free trade  Yes
__________  _________  _________agreem  ent
Poland - Lithuania  1-Jan-97  Free trade  Yes agreementYe
Slovenia - Estonia  1-Jan-97  Free trade  No
____  ____  ___  ____  ____  ___  ___  ____  ___  agreem ent  N
Canada - Israel  1-Jan-97  Free trade  Yes
____  ____  ___  ____  ____  ___  ___  ____  ___  agreem  entYe
EC - Slovenia  1-Jan-97  Free trade  No
agreement
33Slovenia - Lithuania  1-Mar-97  Free trade  No
______  _____  agreement  N
Bolivia - Mercosur  2-Mar-97  Free trade  Yes
agreement  _________
Israel - Turkey  1-May-97  Free trade  Yes
____  ___  ____  ___  ____  ___  ___  ___  ____  ___  agreem  entY  e
CEFTA accession of Rornania  1-Jul-97  Accession to free  Yes trade agreement  1-Ju-97agremet_N
Slovak Republic - Latvia  1-Jul-97  Free trade  No agreement
Slovak Republic - Lithuania  1-Jul-97  Free trade  No agreement  No
Czech Republic - Latvia  1-Jul-97  Free trade  Yes agreement  Yes
Canada - Chile  5-Jul-97  Free trade  Yes agreement
Czech  Republic - Lithuania  1-Sep-97  Free trade  No
______  ______  agreementYe
Czech Republic - Israel  1-Dec-97  Free trade  Yes
Hungar-Turke  1-Apragreement  Yes
Romania - Turkey  1-Feb-98  Free trade  Yes
Chile-Peru___  1  -9agreement  Yes
Hungary - Israel  1-Feb-98  Free trade  Yes
______  ______  agreementYe
Czech Republic - Estonia  12-Feb-98  Free trade  Yes
______  ______  agreementYe
Slovak Republic - Estonie  12-Feb-98  Free trade  No
______  ______  agreement
Poland - Israel  1-Mar-98  Free trade 
agreement
Lithuania - Turkey  1-Mar-98  Free tradeYe
____  ___  ____  ___  ____  ___  ___  ___  ____  ___  agreem entYe
Hungary -Turkey  1  -Apr-98  Free tradeYe
agreementYe
Estonia - Turkey  1-Jun-98  Free tradeYe agreementYe
Chile - Pewu  1-Jul-98  Free Trade  Yes
__________  __________  _________agreem  ent
Mexico - Nicaragua  1-Jul-98  Free Trade  Yes
Agreement  ________
Czech  Republic - Turkey  1-Sep-98  Free tradeYe
______  ______  agreementYe
Slovak Republic - Turkey  1-Sep-98  Free trade  N
____  ____  ____  ____  ___  ____  ____  ____  ___  agreem  ent  N
Slovenia - Israel  1-Sep-98  Free trade  N
________  _______  ________  __  ____  _______  agreem  ent  No
34Bulgaria - Turkey  I-Jan-99  Free trade  No agreement
CEFTA accession of Bulgaria  1-Jan-99  Accession to free  No trade agreement-
Poland - Latvia  1-Jun-99  Free trade  Yes
agreementYe
Chile - Mexico  1-Aug-99  Free trade  Yes
____  ___  ____  ___  ____  ___  ___  ___  ____  ___  agreem  entY  e
EFTA - Moroco  1-Dec-99  Free trade  No
35__  _  _  _  _  _  _agreement
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